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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to explain the transnationalization of financial reporting by corporations. 
Specifically it considers how the status of International Financial Reporting Standards - 
constructed and issued by a private organization: the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB)
 – changed from being highly marginal to almost global adoption. A range 
of explanations (rather than just one) for the transformation are examined and contrary 
(or rather disruptive) evidence, not just supportive, is considered. Having examined a 
variety of explanations, the paper then considers whether or not the now extensive 
transnationalisation of financial reporting can be regarded as evidence that the period of 
national or regional varieties of capitalism (or business systems) is ending.  
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THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
STANDARDS1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In more than 100 countries the consolidated (i.e. group) financial reports issued to 
„external‟ users by listed companies are required to be, or are permitted to be, based on  
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
2
 - constructed and issued by a private 
organization: the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
 3
 In a number of 
other countries new, but still purportedly national regulations are, albeit without 
acknowledgement, largely or wholly based on IFRS.  Countries which require
4
 the use of 
IFRS include all member states of the European Union where since 2005 all annual and 
half-yearly consolidated financial reports issued by listed companies must be based on 
IFRS. Since November 2007 foreign companies listed on a stock exchange in the United 
States (US) can prepare their financial reports exclusively in accordance with IFRS - 
rather than heretofore according to the standards issued by the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB): US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP).   
 
A number of US stock markets, including the New York Stock Exchange, have 
vigorously called for the extension of this replacement of US GAAP by IFRS for US 
companies as well. The organization primarily responsible for the regulation of US stock 
markets, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), has announced that it is 
seriously considering this option with mandatory adoption by all listed US companies 
from 2014 (Cunningham, 2008; Deloitte, 2008). A significant number of US non-listed 
companies voluntarily prepare their financial reports in accordance with IFRS. From 
2012 it is likely that all companies (not just listed as at a present but also non-listed) in 
the UK will be required to do so.
5
 From about 1998 IFRS have been routinely included in 
International Monetary Fund prescriptions and in World Bank requirements of borrowers. 
Most recently, at their September 2009 meeting in Pittsburgh, US, the Group of 20 
Leaders (G20) reaffirmed their commitment to global convergence in accounting 
standards, calling on “international accounting bodies to redouble their efforts to achieve 
a single set of high-quality, global accounting standards within the context of their 
independent standard-setting process” and stated that they should “complete their 
convergence project by June 2011”. 
 
The extensive transnational reach of IFRS is of practical significance. Financial reports 
matter. They have important roles in influencing the distribution of control and profits 
among different groups of stakeholders. They are a major source of information for 
parties external (and internal) to corporations.  Debt agreements and „compensation‟ 
(pay) agreements often contain trigger ratios calculated using information in financial 
reports.  
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The rise of IASB is also of contested theoretical importance. What explains: the extensive 
transnationalisation of financial reporting standards and the demise of previously 
dominant national standard setters in countries requiring the use of IFRS? Why have 
standards or regulations previously constructed  in some countries by governmental 
organizations (e.g. a civil service department) and private sector organizations in others, 
been wholly replaced by those produced by a private organization? Why from a range of 
possibilities: the continuation of national standard/regulations setting; the emergence of 
an alternative global or regional standards setter; the adoption of long-established and 
highly developed US standards as the global or regional standards; the creation of hybrid 
EU standards fused from the diversity of national standards across the EU; or the creation 
of a standard setting body by the EU Commission, did the IASB „succeed‟?  Multiple 
explanations have been advanced for the mode and content of IFRS. And what are the 
implications for the path dependency claims in the varieties of capitalism literature? Is 
the dominance of the IASB evidence of the accuracy of the predictions of wholesale 
transnational convergence and the demise of distinct national (or regional) varieties of 
capitalism?  
 
 
WHY FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS? 
 
There are arguments that regulation of financial reporting is unnecessary as corporations 
have sufficient incentives to disclose voluntarily financial information. But that is very 
much a minority view in policy circles and academia. The dominant view – albeit not 
frequently articulated – is that financial reporting by corporations is a public good which 
will be underprovided unless provision is regulated and that reporting standards reduce 
the social costs of information asymmetry (Lev, 1988). But different financial reporting 
standards generate different measurements (e.g. net profit), sometimes radically different, 
for the same circumstances.   
 
Identifying and reporting the financial performance and position of a corporation is a 
complex challenge which potentially can be done in hundreds, perhaps, thousands of 
different ways. Standards limit choices in relation to a host of specific aspects of 
corporate performance and position including: requiring a single or just a few methods, 
prohibiting others, or obliging a justification by management for the choice made. The 
„usefulness‟ of information produced on the basis of particular standards is a frequently 
mentioned guide to the determination of the content of standards. However, in multi-
institution, multi-person situations, information of a particular type which is useful to 
some may be less useful to others or even detrimental to others.  
 
The ambit of the espoused beneficiaries of financial reporting ranges from, at the 
narrowest, „investors‟, i.e. actual or potential shareholders, to at its widest notions of the 
public interest. The explicit focus of IFRS is mainly towards the former. But shareholders 
are not a homogeneous group. Even if it is supposed that each individual shareholder has 
stable preferences regardless of time or context (a depiction which is not necessarily 
correct) shareholders in general have diverse and conflicting interests and preferences 
based on their differing attitudes, preferences, risk aversions, liquidity desires and needs, 
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degrees of portfolio spread, and life circumstances (Crespi, 2007).  Although bizarrely 
Oliver Williamson states that they “invest for the life of a firm” (1985: 304) shareholders 
relationships with a specific corporation may be brief, and for many it is.  
 
The heterogeneous composition of shareholders debars an optimum framework of choice 
even for standards whose espoused aim is narrowly the usefulness of financial reports for 
shareholders. Whilst the effects of financial reports and changes in specific reporting 
requirements have been extensively researched, the results are often inconclusive. 
Causality is extremely difficult to determine because of the multiplicity of other 
influences and the characteristics of stock markets. Whilst these markets are often 
implicitly or explicitly supposed to be rational in standard setters choice justifications, 
there is, however, a long-standing and immense body of empirical studies demonstrating 
that financial markets are also characterised by irrationalities. Identified irrationalities 
include: psychological contagion leading to irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2000); herd 
mentality (Arthur, 2000); panics and over-reaction to prospects of losses (Campbell and 
Limmack, 1997); under-reaction to earnings (profit) information (Ball and Bartov, 1996); 
and a range of seasonal and day-of-the-week patterns (Cho, Linton, and Whang, 2007; 
Keim and Stambaugh, 1984). At times, “massively confused investors” make 
“conspicuously ignorant choices” (Rashes, 2001). 
 
 
ORIGIN 
 
The IASB, then called the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), was 
founded in 1973.
 6
 In contrast with its current prominence, for more than two decades it 
had little influence.
7
 Even the countries from which the founding organizations of IASB 
came, including the UK where the organization was physically located, largely ignored, 
sometimes patronizingly dismissed, the standards, preferring to use their own.  Adoption 
of its standards was limited to a handful of „Third World‟ countries. Thus, during the 
1970s and 1980s they had little impact. However, from around the mid-1990s an 
increasing number of companies – including, but not exclusively, some large Continental 
European companies - chose to use IFRS.  But with the exception of a handful of 
comparatively small countries, corporate use of IFRS was voluntary. In 2002 however the 
standards were made mandatory (effective from 2005) for all EU countries for the 
consolidated financial reports of listed companies. Since then many other countries (e.g. 
Canada, Australia, and Argentina) have also made the standards mandatory for such 
reports.  
 
This paper considers how the transformation of IASB from its peripheral role to its 
current prominence occurred: how distinctive national regulations, both state and private-
body based in „developed‟ countries, have overwhelmingly (with the part, and possibly 
impermanent, exception of the US) been replaced by regulations based on standards 
constructed by a private non-governmental organization. It does so by describing and 
interrogating alternative explanations. Evidence consistent with almost any theory can 
usually be found. But in identifying such evidence there is the threat of confirmatory bias 
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– a disproportionate imposition of an already held causal explanation.8 That possibility is 
especially problematic in studies of a single case (Lieberson, 1991). 
 
Seeking a richer explanation of the transformation of the influence of the IASB,  a range 
of explanations (rather than just one)  are examined and contrary (or rather disruptive) 
evidence, not just supportive, is considered. The main explanations identified in the 
literature and discussed here are not vulnerable to falsification in the sense that it can be 
demonstrated that they are false, that they have no explanatory value (Quine, 1953). 
Instead the interrogation of these explanations demonstrates: (i) that overall the 
explanations are not competitors but complementary – each is incomplete but nonetheless 
each has some explanatory value indicating the desirability of their incorporation into a 
richer explanation; and (ii) that the causes were not absolute or timeless but dependent on 
contexts and changes in them. Having examined a variety of explanations, the paper then 
considers whether the now extensive transnationalisation of financial reporting can be 
regarded as significant evidence of global convergence, that the period of national or 
regional varieties of capitalism (or business systems) is ending.  
 
 
STANDARDISATION AS GLOBALISATION 
 
Explanation: The transnationalisation of financial reporting standards has been an 
inevitable consequence of “the globalization wave” (Bratton and Cunningham, 2009: 1). 
 
„Globalisation‟ is a usually underspecified term which attributes (critically or 
uncritically) all sorts of seemingly unrelated phenomena to what it widely regarded as an 
unstoppable force. When a transformation occurs within a single country there is no 
reason, in principle at least, why the basis of the change could not wholly be within that 
country - provided - there is potential for an internal dynamic (a possibility effectively 
denied if internal homogeneity is supposed). But when change simultaneously occurs 
across many countries a necessary part of the cause(s) must be outside of those nations – 
otherwise how could such extensive multinational consensus have been achieved? Thus 
not surprisingly, the transnationalisation of IFRS has also been depicted as an outcome of 
an often underspecified notion of unstoppable “globalisation”.  
 
But attributing change to „globalisation‟ does not take us very far. Effect and cause are 
confused.  Like a doctor in a Molière play who attributed the power of a sedative to its 
dormative power, an effect (even if we assume its descriptive accuracy) is superficially 
transformed into a causal explanation. The notion of globalisation is underspecified; it 
does not explain the timing (why not twenty years before or twenty years later?), mode 
(why IFRS, not US GAAP, or whatever and whoever else? or content of change (why the 
particular type of transnational harmonization and not another type?) 
 
As an explanation, however, the notion positively points beyond the national, to look for 
a common cause(s) for changes in what was previously nationally distinct. The step 
change in the influence of the IASB from its position of unimportance during the 1970s 
and into the 1990s coincides with the increasing transnationalization (albeit not uniform 
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globalisation) of financial markets - including increased multinational listing  and the 
increased internationalization of portfolios of shares owned by increasingly important 
institutional shareholders. These developments and their significance for transnational 
standardization of financial reporting are discussed later below. 
 
 
STANDARDIZATION AS MODERNIZATION 
 
Explanation: IFRS transnationalization is modernization. 
 
The adoption of IFRS by the EU, for instance, was described as an event “whose time 
had come” (Inglewood, 2002: 1), as “modernization” (Department of Trade & Industry, 
2004). „Developed‟ societies, at least, it is said, come not only to approximate to each 
other but around ways that are the optimum currently possible. This supposes that IFRS 
represent the most up-to-date, and by implication the best, standards – an evolutionary 
pinnacle. Being the modern IFRS were inevitably accepted.  
 
But this explanation is tautological, the logic is circular. Change by definition creates 
something different. In that sense change is blandly modernization. But an outcome 
(however labelled) is not a cause. The view that IFRS best represent “economic reality” 
and provide the “most useful” information is not self-evident or undisputed. 
 
The explanation is also indiscriminate. The standards produced by the US FASB were as 
equally „modern‟ as those of the IASB in the sense that they were ongoingly developed 
and revised in fora of expertise and in response to challenges from, and „innovations‟ in, 
contemporary business practices. 
 
The notion of modernization however, perhaps, is not entirely without causal force. 
Within the US itself, what the primary goal of corporations should be was a contested 
issue – a debate that goes back at least to Berle and Means (1932), but the mid-1980s was 
the beginning of a new wave of institutional shareholder activism with intensified 
demands that corporations focus on maximizing shareholder value (wealth) a corporate 
focus that drew increasing support from many corporate executives outside, as well as 
inside, of the US. As stock markets within Continental Europe, and elsewhere, expanded, 
and top executive pay was increasingly linked to the performance of corporate securities 
rather than product or market developments, the response within these countries varied 
but concerns were expressed that their image with opinion shapers such as The Financial 
Times and within major securities markets was as “developing countries” in terms of 
corporate governance. Companies which already had or planned to have foreign listings 
or sought to use their companies stock as currency in foreign acquisitions often faced 
critical and sceptical  questions about their corporate governance practices.  Within some 
countries at least the self-perception or the perception of others of their national systems 
of financial reporting, and corporate governance more widely, being old-fashioned would 
appear to influenced them towards „modernization‟. Credit rating agencies and financial 
analysts largely based in the two main securities markets – the US and the UK – have 
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been shown to be biased in favour of Anglo-American style financial reporting and 
corporate governance.  
 
It is noteworthy that from around the mid-1990s „modern‟ and „modernization‟ became 
widely used term to justify particular political acts. For example during the Clinton 
regime, the Democrats in the US were re-named „Modern Democrats‟. The 1999 act 
which replaced the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and removed the firewalls between retail and 
speculative banking was called the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act. In the UK during the Blair regime just about every government action 
was justified in the name of „modernization‟. 
 
 
STANDARDISATION AS RATIONALITY 
 
Explanation: The lack of uniformity in format, content, terminology, and underlying 
measurement bases of financial reports – was inefficient and ineffective for both 
producers and users of such reports. This provided strong incentives for transnational 
uniformity which inevitably led to convergence.  
 
On the supply side, uniformity would eliminate the additional production, processing, 
training, and other costs of preparing and communicating diverse, multinational, financial 
reports. Multinational companies, for instance, could more readily monitor their 
subsidiaries; reduce the information bias against subsidiaries in countries with more 
conservative accounting (such as Germany); be more flexible in transnational movement 
of finance staff;  achieve economies in staff training costs; and reduce compliance costs 
because of the reduction of diversity. As Paul A. Volcker states: “generally accepted 
international standards will reduce the cost of compliance with multiple national 
standards” (2002: 3). 
 
On the demand side, users‟ capacity to understand and compare reports would be 
increased, fewer barriers to transnational trading in corporate securities would exist, and 
was widely claimed capital would be cheaper.
9
 These benefits, it was also argued, would 
largely be achieved because users would be more familiar with and more competent in 
analysing reports based on uniform standards regardless of country of origin (SEC, 
2000). Over time the cost of international communications and transactions plummeted.  
And the use of interactive data formats – whose use is made easier by financial reports 
produced through common standards based formats and terminology – grew extensively. 
Financial reports provided to external parties must first be audited prior to distribution. 
The large international firms that audit the financial reports of most multinational 
corporations had, and continue to have, incentives to promote transnational 
harmonization. This is evident in the central role they played in the establishment and 
funding of the IASB (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). In addition to reduced training and 
processing costs, the transition from national standards to IFRS has boosted the firms‟ 
income fees. 
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The EU Commission had long sought to harmonize financial reporting across the EU in 
the context of its Single Market Project. The draft of its first directive on the subject was 
issued in 1971.
10
 Amongst other arguments, the EU stated that national diversity of 
financial reporting was “hampering the development of a deep liquid single EU capital 
market” (Commission of the European Union, 2000) and as a consequence was said to 
raise the cost of capital for European companies. Commitment by the Commission to 
uniform financial reporting requirements, at least across EU countries, was unwavering.  
 
So, undoubtedly a persistent push existed.  But, as discussed below, it does not 
adequately explain the rise and increasing dominance of IFRS. 
 
Timing: Calls for international harmonization predate the establishment of IASB in 1973. 
Prior to, and in parallel with, IASB a number of organizations apparently with greater 
power than the IASB, particularly the United Nations and the EU Commission also 
sought such harmonization on the basis of standards they would produce. The latter had a 
policy of achieving this aim, across EU
11
 countries, as early as the mid-60s. If a perceived 
demand for efficiency were a sufficient explanation then harmonization would have 
occurred much earlier -even before the founding of IASB, not more than twenty years 
after it was founded. The UN‟s attempts to generate and monitor such standards were 
quashed in 1983.  In 1995 the EU abandoned (albeit reluctantly) its long-standing plan to 
establish a European Accounting Standards Setting Body (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007).  
 
Already Existing Standards: Even before 1973 a comprehensive body of standards 
existed. These had been produced within, and were mandatory for, listed companies in 
the economically most powerful country - the US. If „efficiency‟ were a sufficient 
explanation these standards in existing, or modified form, would have been adopted by 
EU countries and elsewhere. They were not. 
 
Motivation: There is persuasive evidence that a major motive for the establishment of the 
IASB, effectively by these then essentially Anglo-American firms, was a result both of 
their fear that the EU financial reporting programme would continue to be dominated by 
German accounting (an issue that had become more pertinent for the firms with the new 
membership of the EU by the UK and Ireland in 1973)
12
 and by their desires to extend 
and deepen the scale of their business activities within Continental Europe (Hopwood, 
1994). Although international convergence was one of the stated founding aims of IASB, 
overwhelmingly its member bodies focused on national, not transnational, standards. 
 
Mode and Content: Notions of efficiency and effectiveness
13
 do not explain the mode of 
harmonization. Why, as discussed above,  did the IASB became the standard setting 
institution and not the UN, the EU, the OECD, the US FASB, or whoever else?  Nor can 
these notions explain the content of the standards. Why did standards of a particular type, 
specifically shareholder orientated standards, in short Anglo-American-type standards, 
rather than, say, creditor orientated, more conservative, accounting, in short German-style 
standards, became the transnational standards?   
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Insufficiency:  Financial harmonization is patchy. Notions of efficiency are also pertinent 
to other financial areas such as the auditing of financial reports, money laundering 
safeguards, and takeover rules. But these have not been harmonized transnationally, even 
within the EU. Whilst the initial adoption of IFRS in 2002 was accepted almost 
unanimously by the European Parliament, a proposed takeover directive has been highly 
controversial in that parliament.
14
 
 
But we cannot dismiss the influence of the notions of efficiency and effectiveness.  Both 
featured in the justification by EU and US authorities for the greater prominence they 
gave to IFRS. And a changed context increased their pertinence. Quite separate from 
changes in product markets, securities markets became increasingly transnationalized 
from around the mid-1980s and accelerated even faster during the 1990s and beyond. 
Two indicators: between 1986 and 1997 the number of European companies on US stock 
markets increased from 52 to 206 (Gadinis, 2008).  By 1996 the share of non-US 
companies of the total NYSE capitalization was 25% (Porter, 2005).  And the flow was 
not one-way. CalPERS, the largest US pension fund, for instance, had increased its 
investments in foreign markets from 12% of total assets in 1994 to 20% in 1997. In 2000 
foreign shareholders accounted for 37%, 27%, 18%, and 15% of the capital of all 
companies in the UK, France, Japan, and Germany respectively.  The proportion of 
foreign ownership of large companies is even greater.  
 
The majority of shares of many former national corporate champions became foreign 
owned. For instance, Total, Saint-Gobain, and Péchiney of France and ICI, P&O and 
Pilkington of the UK. In 2000, companies from sixty countries were listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. The comparable figure for the New York Stock Exchange was forty-
nine. Growing transnationalization of markets increased the costs of diversity and thus 
increased the incentives for harmonization. In Germany, actions by many large 
corporations (including reductions in cross shareholdings between industrial companies) 
and changes to laws and regulations (including reduction of a capital gains tax constraint 
on the sale by banks and insurance companies of their shareholdings) 
15
 opened up the 
ownership of these companies to trading in ever more active stock markets – principally, 
but not exclusively in New York and London.  
 
In addition to arguments about economies in preparing and processing financial 
information, made more pertinent by the increasing financial internationalization of many 
large companies, it was also held that financial reporting harmonization would reduce the 
cost of capital. The “prime justification for International Accounting Standards is”, Paul 
A. Volcker, Chairman of the Trustees of the International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation states, “a positive one. An essentially borderless world of finance 
requires the standarization of accounting standards if it is to operate efficiently, 
promoting a truly economic allocation of capital” (2004: 4). This is a widely-held yet 
fanciful image of financial markets. But one that is real in its consequences. Rather than 
rational and efficient, self-optimizing, accurately valuing assets and achieving optimal 
resource allocation as Volcker, and many others suggest, there is a also a long-standing 
and immense body of empirical studies demonstrating that securities markets are 
characterised by irrationalities including their use of financial reports (above). 
 12 
Nonetheless this unreal image of efficient and rational securities markets appears to have 
considerable belief and appeal. 
 
 
STANDARDIZATION AS A RESPONSE TO CRISIS 
 
Explanation: Transnational IFRSization was a caused by the Asian Financial Crisis 
and/US Corporate Scandals. 
 
Two crises especially have been credited with the transnationalization of IFRS: the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-98 and the 2001-02 corporate scandals (especially the collapse 
of Enron and the subsequent fall-out, including the vaporization of one of the Big 6 
auditing firms - Arthur Andersen). 
 
Asian Financial Crisis: The crisis was triggered by the collapse of the Thai badht in mid-
1997 (Walter, 2003; Krugman, 1998) and had a severe knock-on effect especially in East 
Asian countries.  
 
Western economists, financial leaders, and international organizations alike pointed 
their collective fingers at poor accounting, lax corporate governance, and crony 
capitalism (Volcker, 2002: 1).  
 
Inadequate and inappropriate accounting (financial reporting) by banks and by their 
clients, including the opacity of their indebtedness, was seen as having misled investors 
and regulators and as having prevented timely interventions which might have prevented 
the crisis. This raised the profile of “high quality” financial reporting standards in 
transnational organizations and meetings. 
 
Following the crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) undertook a 
review of fifteen IFRS. In April 2000 it gave its approval to seven of the standards but 
expressed some concerns about the remaining eight (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). A joint 
IASB-BCBS committee was set up to remedy these concerns. In May 1998 the G-8 
ministers of finance recognized the need to develop “international and auditing 
standards” (Martinez-Diaz, 2005: 13). In October of the same year the G-7 called on the 
IASB to “finalize by early 1999 a proposal for a full range of internationally agreed 
accounting standards” (G-7, 1998).  
 
The idea that “poor accounting” and “lax corporate governance”, and “crony capitalism” 
were the causes of the crisis is contestable. Volcker states that the emphasis on them was 
“overdone” and that “other systemic factors were at play” (2002: 1). The crisis per se did 
not generate the response but rather it was a particular interpretation of the crisis and the 
priority given to that interpretation. 
 
Corporate Scandals: In 2001 and 2002 confidence in US GAAP was shaken by a number 
of corporate scandals – especially those of Enron and WorldCom in the US. As Paul A. 
Volcker states: 
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Strong reservations about international standards [i.e. IFRS] in the United States 
have faded. In the light of all that has happened, no longer can American standard 
setters, regulators, or even politicians sit back and claim that U.S. GAAP is the 
logical and only model for the world (2004: 6).
16
  
 
In the Enron case, the company greatly exaggerated its profits by siphoning debt and 
losses into off-balance sheet entities which in reality were under the direct control of 
Enron management. Between 1993 and 2001 Enron set up more than 3,000 off-balance 
sheet partnerships to massage its financial reports. It took eight years for Enron‟s 
“creative accounting” practices to be uncovered. Enron was America‟s seventh largest 
firm by market capitalization. Fortune Magazine hailed it as America‟s most innovative 
firm for five year‟s running. Whether or not Enron‟s financial reporting practices were in 
breach of US GAAP remains contested (Eaton, 2005). But there was a widescale belief, 
including in the US Congress, that this, and other crises, had revealed flaws in US 
GAAP. Much of the criticism focused not on the specifics of the rules within US GAAP, 
but rather it was asserted that there were too many rules in US GAAP. Those standards 
are an amalgam of dispersed (and sometimes contradictory) literatures published 
primarily by the FASB but also by other bodies, including the SEC and the main US 
professional accountancy body, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. If 
only US GAAP had been shorter, less complex, that is, principles-based, like IFRS, then, 
many critics claimed “Enron‟s shenanigans would have been preempted” (cf. 
Cunningham, 2008: 117). The central criticism was that rules-based accounting enabled 
and encouraged “accounting engineering” – the creative use of the details of the rules to 
evade the spirit.  IFRS on the other hand were lauded both within the EU, US and 
elsewhere for being “principles based”. This was a reverse of an earlier context in which, 
especially from within the US, IFRS were criticized for being too loose and vague. 
 
High-quality accounting standards are the bedrock of good financial reporting and 
the principles based approach of the IAS [sic] will ensure that accounts reflect 
economic reality, thus restoring investors‟ confidence that things are really the way 
they look. The aim of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 
minimize defined rules and exemptions will defeat a culture that boils down to 
“where does it say I cannot?”, one which the many thousands of pages of rules-based 
standards of US GAAP have fostered” (Bolkestein, 2002: 117).17 
 
The separation of financial reporting standards into those which are “principles-based” 
and those which are “rules-based” is specious, as is the claim that IFRS are of the first 
type and US GAAP of the second.
 18
  True, a US GAAP standard is more rules-dense, has 
more rules, usually many more, than an equivalent IFRS. But both contain principles 
(explicitly or implicitly) and both contain rules. But like many false ideas the distinction 
was real in its consequences. It was vigorously used in criticisms against US GAAP and 
in favour of IFRS by parties both within and outside the EU and the US. To such an 
extent that the SEC was mandated by the US Congress, via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) – a legislative response to the scandals - to study the distinction. In its report the 
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SEC stated that “rules-based standards often provide a roadmap to avoidance of 
accounting objectives inherent in the standards” (SEC, 2003: 13).   
 
The Special Investigative Committee‟s report (2002) on the collapse of Enron shows that 
the company plainly violated US GAAP – that the illegal practices were undetected by a 
failure of auditing, fuelled by demands and plaudits of securities markets, and naively 
lauded by leading business schools, including Harvard Business School. But instead of 
focusing on reform of audits and securities markets (whose profound dysfunctionality 
became dramatically evident in the recent „economic crisis‟)  in a context which 
emphasized deregulation and light-touch regulation, and denied the possibility of 
securities market failure (McSweeney, 2009), it was  convenient for some interests to 
scape-goat US GAAP (Cunningham, 2008; Eaton, 2005). For example, the interim report 
of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2006)(commissioned by US Treasury 
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.) and McKinsey & Co.‟s Sustaining New York’s’ and the 
U.S.’ Global Financial Services Leadership (2007)19 (commissioned by New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and US Senator Charles Schumer (NY)) are examples of 
widely publicized post-Enron reports criticizing the US regulatory environment. Each 
routinely calling the environment (including US GAAP) rules-based and advocating a 
principles-based approach. 
 
Opinion was not unanimous within the SEC, a SEC sub-committee report of 2007 was of 
the view that “the principles vs. rules dichotomy is a specious debate” (in Cunningham, 
2008: 118). In the same year a SEC Commissioner described the distinction as “a false 
dichotomy”. But the dominant public position, including statements by the SEC 
Chairman, and another SEC Commissioner, was very critical of the “intense rules-based 
approach of U. S. GAAP” and largely favourable towards rules-based standards, often 
including explicit positive references to IFRS. In its official releases SEC avoided 
outright approval of “principles-based” standards. Instead it advanced the notion of 
“objectives-based” standards scarcely distinguishable from the former. Recognition to the 
„adequacy‟, if not the desirability, of  what was represented as principles-based standards 
was in effect given by the SEC  in August 2007  when it permitted non-US companies 
listed on US securities markets to report exclusively on the basis of IFRS.  
 
Both crises encouraged the adoption of IFRS. After the Asian Financial Crisis the IMF 
and the World Bank routinely included in their prescriptions and this is likely to have 
encouraged a number of Asian countries to adopt IFRS 
20
. In the US in particular, the US 
corporate scandals of 2001-2002 weakened the opponents of acceptance of IFRS such as 
the US FASB,
21
 through the shadow cast on US GAAP, and strengthened its supporters. 
A key relay was the demonization of rules-based standards and the widescale lauding of 
principles-based standards. Neither crisis influenced the EU Commission‟s decision to 
seek to have IFRS adopted for all EU countries – that decision had been made before 
both crises – in 1995.  
 
Long before Enron started to make headlines in the press. Europe made the choice of 
international accounting standards of high quality with the potential to become truly 
global standards (Bolkestein, 2002: 4). 
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However, formal approval for that policy had to be given by the EU Parliament. That was 
sought and achieved after the crises - in 2002. Within that Parliament, IFRS – were 
represented by the EU Commission and others - as European standards whose superiority 
over US GAAP had been revealed by the US corporate scandals (Bolkestein, 2002: 4). 
But that was just one of many arguments the Commission in favour of acceptance. 
During the discussion in the Parliament the scandals were mentioned by just a few 
members. As the endorsement of IFRS was approved almost unanimously (492 for, 5 
against, and 29 abstentions) it is unlikely that the corporate scandals had a significant 
influence on that decision. The major crisis impact was in weakening resistance to IFRS 
in the US and more widely boosting that image of IFRS. 
 
 
STANDARDIZATION AS US HEGEMONY 
 
Explanation: Transnational IFRSisation is an outcome of US hegemony – seen as benign 
or predatory. The adoption of IFRS is regarded as a pretense of multilaterism. In effect 
IFRS are said to be US standards by another name. 
 
[T]the IASC has provided the cover of multilateral legitimacy to mostly U.S. 
standards … an exogenous expression of the [US] domestic political economy” 
(Simmons, 2001: 611 and 595).  
 
As with the other explanations above there is some truth, but not complete truth, in this 
explanation.  First, the validity of the explanation is described and then counterviews are 
considered. 
 
Similarity: Notwithstanding claims that US GAAP is rule based whilst IFRS are 
principles based, fundamentally, IFRS and US GAAP are similar in many respects. That 
is not a coincidence nor is it the outcome of agreement between equals. In addition to US 
GAAP‟s “first-mover” advantage, it is the product of, amongst other processes of 
domination, the commanding position in IASB of Anglo-American auditing firms; the 
patronage of, and influence on, the IASB by the US SEC dominated International 
Organization of Securities Commissions
22
 (IOSCO); the frequent meetings of IASB staff 
with the much more extensively resourced US FASB
23
; and the intellectual preeminence 
in accounting and finance structures of knowledge (such as the major peer reviewed 
journals) by US academics. 
 
US Stock Markets: Increasingly large and vocal US institutional shareholders and (some 
hedge funds) both expanded their ownership of securities in European (and other) firms 
and pressed for changes in corporate governance to conform to the US model. In 1997 
and 1998 for instance, CalPERS issued corporate governance recommendations about the 
UK, France, Germany and Japan indicating its reluctance to invest in countries whose 
corporate government requirements deviated significantly from those of the US. Given 
the proximity of the UK and US models, its criticisms of the UK system were mild, but it 
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was highly critical of those in the other three countries including the „inadequacy‟ of their 
financial reporting compared with that in the US and it called for linking executive 
“compensation” (pay) with increases in “shareholder value” (stock prices). 
Throughout the 1990s the IASB worked closely with US based financial reporting, 
regulatory and stock market bodies. In 1993 International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) (in which arguably the US SEC was the most powerful member) 
agreed to look to IASB to develop financial reporting standards and set out what it 
deemed to be the essential “core” standards. In a moment of self-reflection, the chair of 
the IOSCO committee responsible for the list described the list as perhaps “too much 
influenced by the preoccupations of our North American colleagues” (IASC, 1993: 5). By 
1998 IASB had completed the “core” standards required by IOSCO. In 2000 IOSCO 
gave largely unqualified endorsement to IFRS: 
 
The IASB‟s work to date has succeeded in effecting significant improvements in the 
quality of the IASB standards. Accordingly, the President‟s Committee recommends 
that IOSCO members permit incoming multinational users to use the 30 IASB 2000 
standards [IFRS] to prepare financial statements for cross-border offerings and 
listings, as supplemented … where necessary to address outstanding substantive 
issues at national or regional level (in Eaton, 2005: 5). 
 
Acceptance for listing on US stock markets by non-US companies first required 
production of financial reports on the basis of US GAAP, later (from 1983) reports could 
be produced according to IFRS with the addition of a  statement of reconciliation with 
US GAAP; and since November 2007 reports based solely on IFRS are acceptable. 
However, that does not, it is implied in this explanation, primarily indicate a reduction of 
resistance within the US towards IFRS but a sustained process of US standardization of 
IFRS – and of the very structure and composition of the IASB. The differences between 
IFRS and US GAAP is radically smaller than the gap between IFRS and  the German 
equivalent. The adoption of IFRS by the EU “should”, EU Commissioner Bolkestein, 
stated “pave the way for the United States [sic] to accept international standards for 
listing purposes” (Bolkestein, 2002). The relevant bodies within the US, and the SEC in 
particular, would not have done so unless they were happy the IFRS were fundamentally 
similar to US GAAP, a convergence they had actively sought to achieve. 
 
Reconsititution: In April 2001 the IASC was reconstituted, and renamed the IASB. The 
reorganization was of a type advocated by the US SEC but it differed in significant 
respects from that sought by the EU Commission. The changes in the structures, 
membership, voting powers, and so forth essentially mirrored those of the US FASB 
(Eaton, 2005). 
 
The considerable influence of ideas and institutions based in the US on IFRS is 
undoubted. However, to describe this as a consequence of US hegemony is problematic 
in a number of respects. 
 
Diversity within the US: The explanation is state-centered, in the language of 
international relations theory, it is „realist‟. That is, dominance is supposed to be achieved 
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by a state (in this instance the US) which is assumed to be a coherent whole with uniform 
interests and objectives. Thus, by illustration, EU Commissioner Bolkestein, above, 
refers to acceptance to the US, not to entities within the US, such as the SEC. And yet 
autonomous or relatively autonomous organizations within the US, influential in the field 
of financial reporting have been at odds with each other, rather than echoing or 
determining a common US position.  
 
The FASB has consistently opposed acceptance of IFRS for general use within the US 
and even for listing by non-US companies. Within the American Accounting Association, 
the preeminent academic accounting body in the US two studies reached different 
conclusions (Sunder et al., 2007; Hopkins et al., 2008). Both called for an end to the 
exclusive use of US GAAP by US companies, but one argued for competition – US 
companies should be permitted to choose either US GAAP or IFRS – the other for 
exclusive use of IFRS. US stock markets, and especially the NYSE, have vigorously 
advocated specific and general acceptance of IFRS for those markets. Amongst the 
processes used by the NYSE has been to hire lobbyists to try to influence the US 
congress and the SEC. The former goal accomplished, lobbying for the latter continues. 
The SEC has vacillated somewhat (above), but has approved exclusive IFRS reporting by 
non-US companies and may (the outcome is unpredictable) allow US companies to chose 
either IFRS or US GAAP or require exclusive use of IFRS. Within each of these 
organizations, opinions have varied. The US government has sought „regime change‟ in a 
number of countries, but it does not have a set and uniform policy on transnational 
financial reporting. IASB required the expensing of stock options before the FASB, albeit 
the FASB supported such a position but was delayed in approving such a standard 
because of extensive lobbying against such an action by various parties in the US. 
 
US Standards or Liberal Capital Market Standards? During the rise to prominence of 
the IASB the US securities markets were the largest in the world (in terms of 
capitalization and volume of turnover) but during that period other securities markets also 
grew and attracted not only home country but also foreign listings. In 2000, for example, 
Volkswagen; Hoechst; and Deutsche Bank were quoted on 11, 10, and 9 different 
securities markets respectively (Morgan, 2002). In 2006 Deutsche Börse was able to 
make a credible bid to acquire the London Stock Exchange. Post Cold-War even Moscow 
and Beijing have active and growing securities markets. In the early IASB period few 
countries had the infrastructure to raise and trade large volumes of securities. The fact the 
most established standards – which have shaped IFRS  – were those developed in the US 
(the largest securities market – accounting for nearly 50% of the world‟s stock market 
valuation)(Simmons, 2001: 594) - does not make them US standards in the sense that 
they reflect and serve something uniquely of the US, even the US securities markets, as 
they are standards which orient financial reports towards developed liberal securities 
markets regardless of location: New York, London, Paris, Hong Kong, or wherever. In so 
far as the notion of hegemony is meaningful in this context, what has happened is 
hegemony of increasingly transnational finance capital not of US securities markets.  
 
US Concessions: The abandonment of the requirement for foreign companies listing in 
US securities markets to comply with US GAAP suggests that non-US companies had 
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some leverage. Rather than being able to insist on the exclusiveness of US GAAP, as 
urged by the FASB, the first-mover monopoly had to be abandoned.  
 
Financialization within Continental Europe: The main motive for listing on US stock 
markets by foreign companies was not exclusively or primarily to raise capital, as much 
of the literature suggests. Many false characteristics are attributed to securities markets. 
In fact such markets are, overall, a trivial source, even in so-called liberal market 
economies such as the US and the UK (cf. Nölke, 2008).  By illustration, between 1970 
and 1994 as a source of funds for corporations‟ new shares were -4.6% and -7.6% in the 
UK and the US respectively.
24
 In the US between 1940-1978 only 8% of corporate funds 
were raised via new shares (O‟Sullivan, 2000). Between 1960-1987 only 13% of Fortune 
500 companies issued/sold shares more than once (Ellsworth, 2002).  „Investment‟ by 
shareholders in their own assets through purchase of shares from other shareholders 
(secondary market trading) is confused in the funding myth with investment in a 
corporation (primary market). Only a miniscule quantity of shares traded is new 
investment, overwhelmingly it is trade of shares in an old investment.  
 
Listing, however, provided two other gains for the top executives of the newly listing 
companies. First, it converted their companies‟ shares into a usable „currency‟. 
Internationally, their shares were more acceptable for share swaps for mergers and 
acquisitions. Morgan (2002) reports that in the period 1984-1994 the bulk of the growth 
of employment in German multinationals derived from the acquisition of, or merger, with 
other largely non-German firms.  The Daimler-Chrysler merger, for instance was 
achieved by a share swap. Secondly, greater volumes trading in companies‟ securities in 
larger and more active markets increased the value of top executives share options as a 
form of „compensation‟ that grew in popularity in Germany and elsewhere. Legislative 
changes in 1998 in Germany, for instance, significantly facilitated the implementation of 
stock option plans (Langmann, 2007). As Cunningham (2009: 146) observes “managers 
compensated using stock option or other devices based on reported results will demand a 
different level of conservatism [in financial reporting] than managers not so 
compensated”.  IFRS is less conservative than the standards/regulations of most 
Continental European countries – it produces higher reported profits and higher 
measurements of net assets. Furthermore, the segmental information required by IFRS, 
but not heretofore in Germany or in many other Continental European countries, reduced 
the possibility of cross-division subsidization and facilitated divestment (Ball, 2004). 
 
The picture here is not a dominating US state, nor even a dominating US capital market, 
but an increasing financialization of companies whose securities are traded in multiple 
markets by institutional shareholders, by private equity firms, hedge funds and 
„investment‟ banks. Financialization is not just externally imposed but has been enabled 
and encouraged by top management elites in leading corporations. The break-out by 
German top management and the partial break-up of the German model in the 1990s was 
particularly significant. 
 
The US stock markets were, and remain, albeit not as significantly, the primary securities 
markets. But the EU sought to compete with, not capitulate to, those markets. The EU 
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was committed to “match the United States economically” and regarded the development 
of a “single capital market” across the EU – for which uniform financial reporting was 
considered to be “a necessary precondition (Inglewood [rapporteur of the EU‟s 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market] 2002: 1) – to be  essential.  
 
When urging the EU Parliament to approve a regulation which would make IFRS 
mandatory for consolidated financial reports in all EU countries, the commissioner 
responsible stated: 
 
This subject is of the highest importance … If we succeed in this it will give a strong 
political signal that the European Union is not only serious about achieving an 
integrated capital market by the year 2005, as requested by the European Council in 
Lisbon two years ago, but also ready to lead on the development of international 
accounting standards. Comparable, transparent financial reporting is an essential 
building block for the realization of integrated, competitive and attractive EU capital 
markets … IAS will also provide the relevant and reliable information which 
investors and other stakeholders need to make meaningful cross-border and cross-
sector comparisons throughout the European Union. Listed European companies 
have long been awaiting the signal that this Parliament is now ready to give 
(Bolkestein, 2002: 4). 
 
Earlier the Commission had observed that: “Investors are deprived of comparable 
accounts and therefore essential information. Cross border trade is hampered. In short, 
the result is market fragmentation that puts EU securities markets globally at a severe 
competitive disadvantage” (Commission of the European Communities, 2000:5). 
 
A London based body
25
 gave the appearance of being Europe based and the EU did not 
have the time or the technical resources to develop its own standards. In 1995 the EU 
Commission had already observed that: 
 
There is a risk that large European companies will be increasingly drawn towards 
US GAAP. They and the member states are looking to the Union for a solution that 
can be implemented rapidly (European Commission, 1995: para. 3.3)(emphasis 
added) 
 
And went on to say: 
 
[T]he IASC is producing results which have a clear prospect of recognition in the 
international capital markets within a timescale which corresponds to the urgency of 
the problem (European Commission, 1995: para.4.4). 
 
 
Not Identical Outcomes: Notwithstanding the similarities between IFRS and US GAAP, 
financial reports based on them are not necessarily, and are in fact very rarely, identical 
to each other.  
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Of the 130 SEC filings covering fiscal year 2006 by foreign private issuers, containing 
IFRS reports reconciled to U.S.GAAP, only two reported identical profit amounts. The 
variations tend to result in higher reported IFRS profits than U.S. GAAP (eighty-four of 
these instances existed, by a median differentiation of 12.9%) although there were also 
forty-four instances where IFRS reported lower profit than GAAP (by a median 
difference of 9.1%). Across the European Union, differences are significantly influenced 
by the legal origin of the firm‟s home country (i.e., common law or civil law traditions). 
 
Two reasons are largely responsible for the differences. First, overall, IFRS are less 
conservative than US GAAP (Cox, 2009).  Secondly, IFRS are not as prescriptive as US 
GAAP and usually provide a greater number of options for a reporting company to 
choose from, and contain relatively lesser guidance options. These options can be chosen 
in a more or lesser conservative way. In increasingly financialized financial markets the 
pressure is towards less conservative (i.e. higher profit reporting choices).  
 
Top management of listed companies have increasingly become a key driver within 
financialized markets as their pay has become ever more linked to stock market 
performance. Notions of „agency‟ – and the idea that shareholders were the only group 
whose interest should be maximized by a corporation - became fashionable and 
influential not only in the US, but more widely. In 1980 stock options accounted for 19% 
of CEO remuneration in large United States corporations but it had risen to about 49% by 
2000 (Lazonick, 2007). Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that it has continued to rise 
further since then.  Directly linking significant portions of the payments (usually 
euphemistically called „compensation‟) of top management with financial markets was 
supposed to channel them “away from extracting opportunistic rent and towards 
maximizing shareholder value” (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, and Yoder, 2007, p. 1025).  
The aim is “to motivate managers to disgorge the cash [to shareholders] rather than 
investing it at below cost or wasting it in organizational efficiencies” (Jensen, 1986: 33). 
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But identifying the relationship(s) between CEO (and other top management) 
remuneration (widely defined) and corporate performance is rather elusive as corporate 
performance is multifaceted and not just a consequence of top management decisions 
(Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder, 2007; Larcker and Richardson, 2007; McGahan and 
Porter, 1997; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Yermack, 1997). It is also created by the actions 
of others within and outside corporations and by circumstances beyond the control of top 
management. Based on a review of 220 studies, Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya 
(2003) found “few examples of systematic relationships” between stock ownership and 
corporate performance.  A meta-analysis of 137 CEO remuneration studies found that 
firm performance accounted for less than 5% of the variance in CEO remuneration (Tosi, 
Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). In 2007, average pay of top management of US 
listed companies increased by 20.5% over 2006 earnings, but in the same period those 
corporations‟ profits had, on average, increased by only 2.8% (AFL-CIO, 2009). A major 
beneficiary of the financialization of corporations has been its CEOs and other top 
management. As Froud et al. (2006) conclude that “top managers … appear to be an 
averagely ineffectual officer class who do, however, know how to look after themselves.”  
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Not surprisingly therefore, support for less conservative IFRS has come from many US 
listed companies and their representative bodies. As it has from similar elites in many 
other countries – but not because of a „US‟ imposition.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The rise of the IASB a private organization from comparative obscurity to huge 
international significance is not a unique achievement. 
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  But that accomplishment  by 
private organizations has both common and different features. Global harmonization or 
global adoption of some standards have occurred with little or no role by the public sector 
(including central state authorities). However, in relation to the near global harmonization 
of accounting standards (for consolidated reports) public sector actors the US SEC and 
the EU Commission played – and continue to play - crucial roles (Boztem and Quack, 
2006). However, for decades adoption of IFRS, and into a period of more intense use by 
significant numbers of major European companies, their use was voluntary. It was not 
imposed directly or indirectly by a national or regional state. Indeed that accelerated 
voluntary use was a major influence on the decision by the EU to make their use 
mandatory. The lengthy process was political both in the sense of struggles within and 
between countries/regions and in that the technical and the political were intertwined 
(Frankel and Højberg, 2009). Constestation between interested parties retarded 
transnationalization in some circumstances, but it accelerated it in others. 
 
The paper does not attempt to provide a complete model of how and why the 
transnationalization of IFRS occurred. It is unlikely that such closure is possible. 
However, through an analysis of single cause explanations which dominate the literature 
on the genesis of international financial reporting standards, the paper has sought to move 
towards a richer explanation by identifying both the limitations and insights of each of 
the singular explanations. 
 
Exclusively exogenous, or more precisely: extra-national, explanations alone obscure 
how sub-state actors and interactions were essential. What happened both in the EU and 
the US was the consequence of deep-domestic as well as a transnational or international 
process. The „break-out‟ of some major Continental European firms from the corporate 
governance traditions in their home countries via listings on the New York Stock 
Exchange – motivated in part by the desire to convert their shares into a more acceptable 
acquisition „currency‟ generated pressure both within their home countries and on the EU 
Commission. Intertwining between financial institutions and industrial companies 
loosened, formal and informal restrictions on top executive pay weakened the 
nationalities of owners of shares in these companies increasingly extended beyond the 
home country – home in the sense of the location of the head-office.  The transnational 
mobility of finance capital increased quite dramatically. Within these developments 
changes in perceptions about the roles of financial reporting both reflected and 
contributed to these many of these changes, not least in increasing the demand for the 
production of financial reports of a type which buyers, holders, and sellers of corporate 
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shares were more familiar. Use of US GAAP by non-US companies grew. This created a 
dilemma for the EU.  
 
On the one hand it had long sought to harmonize financial reporting across the EU – as 
part of its Single Market aspiration - but had been frustrated by an impasse between the 
UK and Germany with very different corporate governance systems and related types of 
financial reporting. In contrast with the stalled progress across the EU at inter-
governmental level, sub-state (non-governmental, within country) actors viz. some large 
European corporations were moving towards harmonization through adoption of US 
GAAP, and to a lesser extent IFRS.  
 
On the other hand adopting US GAAP – produced in a non-EU country - as EU standards 
would have been unacceptable to the EU Commission, though not necessarily to some 
corporations at least, and quite probably to the EU Parliament also (who would have had 
to approve adoption). Adopting IFRS provided a better, albeit not perfect, alternative for 
the EU. The „break-out by many large EU companies had made resolution urgent. The 
EU Commission feared wholesale use of US GAAP by large EU companies. But the EU 
did not have an alternative set of standards to US GAAP nor could it develop such 
standards within a reasonable period.  IASB, however, during its decades of 
peripheralization, had created a comprehensive set of standards. The IASB, unlike US 
standard setters, was not „tied‟ to one or indeed any state, but London based it could be 
represented as a European organization. Whilst the EU could not directly influence the 
standard setting and approval processes of either the US FASB or the US SEC, there was 
a prospect that they might be able to do so with the IASB and it reserved, and continues 
to reserve, the right not to accept individual IFRS. Furthermore, US GAAP in the mangle 
of practice – especially in the very litigious US environment - had become rule and 
guidance dense - too lengthy and complex to be imposed de novo on countries which had 
not previously used it. 
 
The acceptability to, indeed the pressures for acceptance of, multinational adoption of 
IFRS generated by EU and US stock markets, and by the international body of stock 
market regulators, IOSCO, made the adoption of IFRS by the EU both easier and more 
desirable. Reasons for the attractiveness of IFRS for stock markets have not been 
explored in this paper, but briefly one can point to the increased volume of trading stock 
markets anticipated widescale adoption of IFRS would generate and the somewhat less 
conservative underpinning of IFRS seen as especially desirable during the period of focus 
on boosting shares prices secure in the „knowledge‟ that financial market failure was 
impossible (McSweeney, 2009a). 
 
 Changing contexts, sub-state actors, exogenous influences, national or rather regional 
pride, urgency, a history of tardy progress at inter-governmental level, and an already 
established set of standards all contributed to the adoption of IFRS by the EU. 
 
The process of part (and potentially full) adoption of IFRS in the US was also a 
combination of the external and the internal intensified by a specific event or events. 
External pressure came from a variety of sources. The increasing growth of non-US stock 
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markets reflecting a wider economic „liberalization‟ and a general shift of economic 
focus eastwards generated much commentary on ways to improve the „competitiveness‟ 
of US stock markets. Allowing non-US companies listed on US stock markets to report 
via IFRS - less onerous than US GAAP - was one adopted change. The prior adoption of 
IFRS by the EU made the change apparently more desirable. Notwithstanding the desires 
and active lobbying of Congress and elsewhere for wholesale adoption of IFRS for all 
(domestic and non-domestic) listed companies in the US continuity of US GAAP seemed 
assured until the surfacing of a number of major corporate – most significantly Enron - 
scandals in the US. It is highly questionable whether Enron was a consequence of a 
failure of US GAAP.  Whilst the Enron (and other corporate scandals) initially generated 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (an increase in regulation) Enron „post-mortems‟  greatly 
emboldened light-touch/de-regulation advocates whose views were sympathetically heard 
by the Bush Jr. administration. A rather facile, but highly influential distinction between 
rule-based US GAAP and principles-based IFRS was echoed in a range of US policy-
making circles, most significantly for financial reporting, in the SEC. 
 
 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
 
For more than two decades the field of international or comparative financial reporting 
had been dominated by studies of national differences. The focus was on „fundamentally 
different‟ „patterns‟ or „systems‟ in different countries or clusters of countries. Countries 
or states seemed to be the „natural‟, unit of comparison. Usefully that literature enhanced 
awareness of the influence of „environment‟, or „societal effects‟ on accounting 
development and practice away from the depiction of a neutral technology which 
„faithfully reflected economic reality‟. But the primary or exclusive environmental 
influence it focused on was a supposedly uniform national one and as a consequence the 
outcome is deemed to be homogeneity within countries and differences between 
countries. The transnationalisation of IFRS across all European Union (EU) countries – 
and their acceptance in many other countries – would seem to have made the notion of 
national differences redundant – at least in relation to financial reporting regulations. But 
is that so?  
 
Some versions of varieties of capitalism represent institutions within nations as all part of 
an integrated mutually dependent and supporting whole (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Within 
that model “[a]ccounting standards are an integral foundation of a particular variety of 
capitalism” (Nölke, 2008: 13). If that is so, then the adoption of IFRS by German listed 
companies is both a symptom and part of the cause of the demise of a German variety of 
capitalism. However:- 
 
Incoherent: The logic of path dependence theories - including the national cultural and 
the institutional varieties of capitalism schools - predict the stability of regulatory 
arrangements, including the law and policy of corporate governance. But these have 
undergone remarkable change. For more than twenty years, research in social science 
(economics, sociology, politics, accounting, and so forth) which has looked beyond a 
single country has been dominated by the nation as the comparative unit of analysis 
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(Strange, 1996) and as the main actor in the international sphere (Waltz, 1993). Emphasis 
is put on uniformity (of institutions, values, etc.) within countries, or clusters of countries, 
and differences between them. It is difficult, if not impossible, to credibly explain change 
on this basis (McSweeney, 2002a, 2002b, 2009b). The insistence on national uniformity 
precludes any theory of change springing from internal dynamics (Archer, 1988). 
Logically the component parts of any complex can generate change but only if some 
internal heterogeneity is allowed. The neglect, indeed effectively the denial, of internal 
dynamics means that change can only be plausibly explained by external force (not 
merely influence).  National varieties models (cultural and institutional) can cope with 
the fact that changes in external circumstances do not always lead to internal change but 
they incorrectly predict that externally created changes will also always have national 
variation. There are many counter-examples of which the transnational IFRSisation is 
one. 
 
Revisionist work in the varieties of capitalism field by Colin Crouch, Wolfgang Streek, 
and others reject the idea of national institutions as institutionally complete and coherent 
– institutions, and elements of institutions, can, it is argued, be combined. Inherently 
contradictory codes can co-exist in varying types of separation or combination (Elias, 
1969). Thus a change in one institution or one element in an institution does not, of itself 
indicate or cause a change to the whole.  
 
Diversity Continues: IFRSs are required within the EU (and elsewhere) for consolidated 
accounts, not (as discussed above) for individual company financial reports. The former 
may influence the latter but there are barriers to change within countries where individual 
company financial reporting is closely tied to the calculation of corporate tax. IFRS (and 
US GAAP) are built on a supposition of separateness. That distinction applies in some 
countries, including the US and the UK, but not in others such as Germany and France. 
Diversity of reporting by individual companies will therefore continue into the 
foreseeable future. Very strong objections have been expressed in the EU Parliament to 
the extension of IFRS (even IFRs-lite) to small and medium sized companies across the 
EU. 
 
Implementation: Formal acceptance of new standards/regulations tells us little about 
their implementation, use, and impact. Whilst it is reasonable to suppose that differences 
– in terms of format and disclosure at least – in consolidated financial reports of listed 
companies will be reduced significantly – formal rules do have impacts - harmonization 
is likely to remain incomplete. IFRS, like all sets of financial accounting standards are 
not totally prescriptive. They are not a „total enclosure‟ as they do not cover all aspects of 
financial reporting; they allow choices in particular instances; and rely on management 
judgment in others. All important financial reporting decisions require judgments. 
Valuations of assets, for instance, necessarily rely on expectations about hypothetical 
future events (McSweeney, 2000).  
 
Those choosing between alternative policies, when IFRS provide alternatives, and in 
making judgments (which must be made whether or not alternatives are permitted) do so 
in the contexts of the specific strategies of the individual corporation about which a 
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financial report is being prepared and subject to other local factors. Thus, we must await 
wider use of IFRS and more empirical research on the implementation of IFRS to see 
what impact particular contexts of production and use may have in different countries and 
other contexts. Furthermore, if differences in interpretation are institutionally/culturally 
created then given their extensive intra-national variation (McSweeney, 2009b) then we 
should see continuing variation in practice – harmonization will not achieve uniformity 
across or indeed within EU countries. In contrast with the US where a federal body, the 
Securities & Exchange Commission is in charge of financial reporting standards, the 
enforcement of IFRS within the EU is being left largely to individual EU countries. Some 
EU member states are notorious for ignoring EU directives and regulations, especially the 
Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal. In 2006 IOSCO established a 
process to identify varieties of interpretation of IFRS within the 100 or so countries 
affiliated to it. On the one hand this is an indication of anticipated deviations but also of 
likely attempts to eliminate or reduce diversity. Overtime, that diversity may damage the 
image of IFRS as uniformly creating “high quality” and comparable financial reports. 
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1 This paper was first presented at: Governing Through Standards An International 
Symposium, Copenhagen, 24-26 February 2010. The symposium was organised by the 
Danish Institute for International Studies. 
 
2
 Some of the standards – those first developed – are called International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). Subsequent standards are called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
distinction is a historical legacy and does not indicate any qualitative difference between the 
standards. In this paper „IFRS‟ refers to both IAS and IFRS. 
 
3
 In 2001 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was restructured and 
renamed the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). There is “substantial continuity” 
(Ball, 2006: 6) between the organizations. In this paper, unless otherwise stated, the label IASB is 
used regardless of whether the organization was at the time referred to known as the IASC or the 
IASB. 
 
4
 Transnational standards may be enforced on the basis of deference or endorsement. In the 
former case, once a standard is adopted by a recognized standard setting body, it becomes a 
binding standard in member states. In the latter case a sovereign authority such as a national (or 
multi-national) securities regulator or legislation must formally enact them. In most instances, 
including the EU, endorsement of IFRS is required. 
 
5
 It is likely that the target deadline of 2012 will slip, but the commitment is firm. 
 
6
 IASB was founded by organizations of accountants (accountancy bodies) – not the financial 
reporting regulatory bodies - of a number of countries viz. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United States. These bodies were dominated by 
the national parts of the large auditing firms. 
 
7
 Botzem and Quack‟s (2006: 266) view that after its formation in 1973 IASB “could claim centre 
stage of the international [financial reporting] standard-setting arena” greatly overstates IASB‟s 
influence. 
 
8
 That is not to argue that it is possible to examine a situation uninfluenced by categories, 
theories, hunches, and so on. 
 
9
 The magnitude of cost of capital benefits from financial report disclosure is an unsettled 
research question (Ball, 2006: 11). 
 
10
 Approved in 1978. 
 
11
 Then called the European Economic Community. 
 
12
 The same year IASB was formally founded. 
 
13
 For a deconstruction of the notions of „efficiency‟ and effectiveness see McSweeney (1988). 
 
14
 The Parliament has subsequently been split over some standards e.g. IFRS 8. 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15
 These sales allowed much greater purchases of shares in German companies by non-Germans 
who by 1999 owned 15% of all German shares (Jürgens, Naumann and Rupp, 2000). 
 
16
 Europe was not free of corporate financial scandals, for example, Gescartera in Spain and 
Parmalat in Italy. 
 
17
 At that time, Bolkestein was an EU Commissioner. 
 
18
 The US is an enforcement intense society. The rules density of US GAAP is in part a product 
of engagements over time with diverse and controversial applications.  In contrast, IFRS are 
much newer than US GAAP standards. A maturing IFRS might be expected to become more rule 
dense. 
 
19
 This report contains extensive data confirming New York‟s declining dominance as a 
capital market. 
 
20
 This latter point is speculative. I have not yet sought evidence for or against this view. 
 
21
 In October 2002, the FASB and the IASB announced the issuance of a 
memorandum of understanding, called the Norwalk Agreement. The two bodies 
acknowledged their joint commitment to the development, “as soon as practicable,” of 
high-quality, compatible accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and 
cross-border financial reporting. At that time, the FASB and the IASB pledged to use their best 
efforts to make their existing financial reporting standards fully compatible as 
soon as is practicable and to co-ordinate their future work programs to ensure that once 
achieved, compatibility is maintained. 
 
22
 Founded in 1983 out of an inter-American organization of 1974. 
 
23
 The two boards “have established a video link between each other‟s meetings so Board and 
staff members can observe and participate in each other‟s discussions” (Tweedie, 2005: 598). 
 
24
 The reason for shares being a negative source in this period in the US and the UK is primarily 
the increase in share buy-backs by companies.  
 
25
 Although the full-time staff of the IASB are located in London its controlling entity the 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation is incorporated in the US state of 
Delaware Ironically, whilst the IASCF/IASB calls for greater disclosure (of a particular type), 
Delaware is the U.S. state requiring the lowest level of disclosure in the US. 
 
26
 Amongst other things, this eulogy of financial markets ignores the fact that available evidence 
suggests that corporations which are not controlled by financial markets performed at least as 
well as those which are (Fligstein and Choo, 2005) and relies on the normative justification of 
favouring shareholders interests, at the expense of other stakeholders. 
 
27
 To take the example of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and its sister 
organization the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), like the IASAB they had long 
been established but were little known and of minor significance until into the 1980s.  Both like 
the IASB are, and were, privately funded. They too stood (like IASB) in the shadow of powerful 
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national organizations such as DIN (the German Institute for Standardization) or BSI (the British 
Standards Institution).  But today they jointly account for approximately 85% of all known 
international technical standards and their annual output has doubled since the early 1980s (Mattli 
and Büthe, 2003). 
 
